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  2Abstract
∗ 
This study examines the impact of unionization and the level of centralization in 
bargaining, at the level of the industry or the firm, on wages and on the economic 
performance of firms within the manufacturing sector in Uruguay, using a panel 
of establishments for the period 1988 to 1995. In doing so, we control for the 
degree of exposure to international and regional competition as well as for 
industry and firm characteristics.  
The main findings suggest that unionization increases wages and 
employment and promotes investment due to firms substituting labor by capital. 
Unions tend to organize in those plants with highest rates of profits, but promote 
increases in productivity and prevent profitability increases. The mechanism at 
work seems to be that firms moved to more capital-intensive technologies, hence 
increasing the rate of growth of labor productivity and reducing that of 
profitability. Given the negative effect of unionization at the industry level on the 
rate of growth of profitability of firms, results also suggest that unions tended to 
organize and to be stronger in those sectors in which extra rents were higher due 
to monopoly power. 
The evidence also suggests that firm-level negotiations take into account 
the interests of both parties, so that enhanced productivity and probably survival 
were achieved together with lower rates of substitution between labor and capital 
and/or lower profits. 
  
 
                                                           
∗ We acknowledge the assistance of Dardo Curti in estimating the survival models here reported, as well as 
Alejandro Retamoso for his help in data processing. 







  4Introduction  
 
This paper examines the impact of unionization and the level of centralization in bargaining (the 
industry or the firm) on wages and on the economic performance of firms within the 
manufacturing industries in Uruguay.  
Previous work on the impact of labor market institutions (Cassoni, Labadie and Allen, 
1995) has shown the significance of unionization in understanding employment determination, 
labor mobility and the performance of the Uruguayan labor market. The response of wages to 
macroeconomic conditions was also examined, concluding that the observed compression and 
lower response are the consequences of the resumption of collective bargaining (Cassoni, Allen 
and Labadie, 1996). This same conclusion was also found when comparing the evolution of 
wages and employment before and after re-unionization (Cassoni, Allen and Labadie, 2000a). 
However, in that same study evidence was also found signaling a decrease in the wage gap 
generated by unions in the mid-1990s. These changes could be linked to the fact that firms and 
unions started bargaining at a more decentralized level and also to a change in the issues over 
which negotiations took place, including employment and working conditions. Evidence of 
reduced turnover rate among unionized industries was also found. Thus, a new study was carried 
out in order to further explore these effects and its conclusions showed that starting in 1992, 
unions have had a positive impact on employment, while decreasing their effect on wages 
(Cassoni and Labadie, 2001). Trade unions are also found to buffer the effects of fluctuations in 
product demand and of external shocks on employment. Further, the extent of firm-level 
bargaining has also favored the above effects. Finally, it was also shown that unions affect the 
distribution of employment between production and non-production workers. Given the relative 
wages of these categories, unions reduce the proportion of production workers. However, as they 
also buffer the impact of external shocks on the employment mix, the direction of the total effect 
depends on the degree of import penetration and the share of exports in total sales of each 
manufacturing industry. 
From the above it is clear that unions introduced rigidities into the labor market in the 
1980s, especially by raising the wage above its market clearing level. The fact that unions did not 
bargain over employment caused lower rates of hiring while the fear of strikes generated labor 
hoarding. Firms used hours of work in order to adjust their labor input to fluctuations in product 
demand. At the beginning of the 1990s, however, workers started worrying about job instability, 
  5while the rules of bargaining changed, mainly by eliminating the previous mandatory extension 
of collective agreements. This, in turn, promoted the inclusion of work conditions as a 
bargaining issue and the gradual upsurge of decentralized bargaining (at the firm level).  
What effects did all these phenomena have on the performance of the firm? Two different 
scenarios can be imagined. First, the rigidities introduced by union action in the mid-1980s, 
primarily high wages, could have become an incentive for firms to move toward more capital-
intensive technologies. They would have thus increased the level of investment to achieve 
productivity gains and higher rates of profit. This should have implied a further reduction in the 
level of employment. It has to be noted, however, that the same output could have also been 
obtained under a bargaining model in which job stability was an issue, so that cooperation 
between unions and managers would have eased the introduction of new technology while the 
effects on labor demand were not necessarily negative. Another possible scenario is that unions 
kept bargaining over wage levels and preventing firms from adjusting the employment level, thus 
reducing productivity. In a context of increased competition, profitability should also be reduced. 
Further, underinvestment should be expected, as unions would also try to obtain extra rents from 
capital. 
The three indicators mentioned—the investment rate, profitability and productivity—are 
generally seen as good indicators of firm performance. Hence, to shed light on the effects of 
trade unions on these variables will help to understand the real mechanisms at work. In order to 
do so, these effects are here estimated using data from 1988 to 1995 at the establishment level. 
The dataset includes not only surviving establishments but also new ones and those that closed 
during the period as well. The methodology makes it possible to overcome some of the problems 
that result from using aggregate data as discussed in the literature, as well as some of the biases 
resulting from mortality selection in a balanced panel (Hammermesh, 1993).  
 
1. Stylized Facts on the Uruguayan Economy in the 1980s and 1990s
1 
 
Uruguay started implementing a series of policies oriented towards opening its economy 
beginning in the mid-1970s. However, it was not until the early 1990s that the effects were 
actually felt at the micro level, both in terms of production and the allocation of resources of 
local firms. This was partly due to the starting high levels of tariffs but also to the existence of 
  6non-tariff barriers. At the same time, the reciprocal tariff reductions with Argentina, Brazil and 
Paraguay brought about by the Mercosur agreements introduced strong competitive pressure into 
an economy that was heavily dependent on the region in terms of its exports and imports and 
also heavily threatened by regional competitors.  
  Towards 1988, Uruguay had successfully overcome the 1982-84 economic recession 
during which GNP declined by 15 percent, and favorable external conditions allowed the country 
to grow until 1990. However, the historical significance of external regional shocks was once 
again felt in 1991, when Argentina implemented its monetary reform (Plan de Convertibilidad), 
changing the relative prices of tradables and non-tradables and generating a positive impact in 
terms of product and employment for the service and non-tradable industries in Uruguay. 
Exports to Argentina increased 130 percent in 1991 and 74 percent in 1992, moving Brazil to 
second place among destinations of Uruguayan exports. These dynamics led to growth, but with 
a change in the share of tradable and non-tradable sectors (Figure 1). Uruguay’s stabilization 
plan, in turn, although more gradual and less comprehensive than Argentina’s, also started to 
have positive effects in 1991 and 1992; inflation, which had peaked at 129 percent in 1990, 
declined to 30 percent in 1996. As a consequence, imports into Uruguay increased greatly 
between 1990 and 1995, partly due to tariff reduction and trade preferences granted through 
Mercosur, but also due to an exchange rate appreciation and an increase in domestic expenses.  
At the same time, exports to Brazil and Argentina also increased significantly, especially in 
terms of their relative share. 
 


















Source: Central Bank of Uruguay 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
1 This section is largely based on de Brun and Labadie (1997). 
  7The macro changes described above were particularly felt by firms in the manufacturing 
sector in Uruguay. While manufacturing represented 27 percent of GDP in 1987, it steadily 
declined to 18 percent in 1999. The composition of the sector changed as well. In 1985-1987, 21 
percent of total sales were exports, while in 1999 that figure rose to 30 percent. There is 
additionally great variance within the manufacturing sector. Industries like textiles and leather, 
which already had export levels of around 40 percent in 1985, were exporting nearly 80 percent 
of their sales in 1995; industries like paper and printing, or metal products, have never exported 
more than 20 percent of sales. Still, all industries significantly increased their export levels 
during the 1990s. At the same time, exports to Mercosur increased in terms of their share, 
enhancing the importance of the region and the vulnerability of local industries to the regional 
shocks and regional competitors (Figures 2 and 3). 
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Source: Central Bank of Uruguay. 
  8It is thus seen that one of the effects of the Mercosur on Uruguayan manufacturing was 
promoting changes in the origin of imports and the destiny of exports. Countries in the region 
have become a more convenient market for Uruguayan manufacturing goods while, with a lower 
common external tariff, imports from the rest of the world have increased sharply, although only 
after 1994. 
The manufacturing sector shrank in the 1990s while the level of manufacturing 
employment decreased even more. While in 1990 168,000 workers were employed in 
manufacturing, representing 15 percent of total employment, by 1999 that number had declined 
to 96,000, representing only 8 percent of total employment. Accordingly, wage increases started 
to decelerate and a decline is registered starting in 1994 (Figures 4 and 5).  
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Source: National Institute of Statistics, Central Bank of Uruguay. 
  9Starting in 1993 there was a significant increase in the previously declining average 
productivity of the sector, due in part to the restructuring of many manufacturing firms but also 
to the reduction of their personnel. It seems to be the case that lowering the level of employment 
was the way that the manufacturing sector adapted to reduce its wage costs in the context of 
unfavorable relative prices and increasing competitiveness. Granted, the actual employment 
numbers take into account only partially the different outsourcing strategies that the sector also 
developed. The available information on outsourcing refers to 1994-1996 and it indicates that, in 
total, the manufacturing sector outsourced activities that involved 2.2 percent of its personnel.
2 
Larger firms had lower proportions of their personnel outsourced. However, the reductions in 
personnel were particularly high among those exporting firms (those that export 75 percent or 
more of their production), while relatively lower among the sub-sample of firms that export to 
Mercosur. More interesting is the result that non-unionized firms outsourced areas with higher 
proportions of personnel in the period 1994-96 than unionized firms, thus suggesting that unions 
did care about this issue and bargained over employment in that period. Further, the reduction of 
employees via outsourcing was higher among those firms that had collective agreements only at 
the industry level than for those with firm-level agreements (5.4 percent versus 2.4 percent). It is 
apparent and theoretically consistent that those firms bargaining at a more decentralized level 
negotiated over employment more than those that were not. 
 
2. Labor Unions and Labor Relations in Uruguay and its Manufacturing 
Sector 
 
2.1. Labor Unions in Uruguay 
 
The existence of unions in Uruguay can be traced back to the beginning of the century, but it was 
only in the early 1940s that they started playing an active role in wage setting, negotiations 
taking place in the so called Wage Councils. A distinctive characteristic of the Uruguayan wage 
councils was the fact that they were tripartite bargaining stances: representatives of the workers, 
the firms and the government negotiated at the wage councils. Their main objective was to set 
the minimum wage by sector and occupation. However, they also ensured that their resolutions 
were effectively undertaken and acted further as mediators in conflicts. Whatever was settled at 
                                                           
2 These calculations were performed using a special purpose survey on firm performance that was carried out by the 
Department of Economics at the Social Sciences Faculty of the University of Uruguay. 
  10the wage council was enforced on all firms within the sector, whether they were seated at the 
bargaining table or not.  
In 1964 the first central union was created under the name of CNT (National Convention 
of Workers). Only two years after that, representatives of all workers in the economy were part 
of the central union. The strong summoning power showed by the central union served as a 
means to ratify it as an important social actor. However, with the advent of the military 
government in 1973, unions and all activities related to them were declared illegal so that 
unionization was completely banned. Only at the beginning of the eighties the government, still 
military, authorized the existence of associations of workers at the firm level. This smoothed the 
path towards re-unionization. In 1984, a year before democratic elections took place again, the 
union movement was informally re-organized under the name of PIT-CNT
3 and wage councils 
were reinstated in 1985, playing a very similar role as before the military coup.  
Employers’ associations, and specifically some firms, actually set wages over the 
minimum level negotiated. Hence the most active opponent to unions’ claims in the bargaining 
table in the 1980s was, in the end, the government that was pursuing an inflation stabilization 
policy. The government’s main instrument in this pursuit was that governmental approval meant 
mandatory extension of the result of negotiations to all firms in the sector, regardless of whether 
they were effectively represented in the council. Given the wage, firms were free to determine 
the level of employment.  
Although bargaining took place at the economic sector level, the central union generally 
succeeded in obtaining the consensus of the different unions to establish a common percentage of 
wage increase during 1985-1992. Bargaining could be thus considered quite synchronized during 
this period. However, as some firms ended up raising wages above the level set in the agreement, 
the positive effects of co-ordination finally vanished (Calmfors and Driffill, 1988). 
In 1991 the new government publicly announced its intention to abandon the bargaining 
table in all sectors except for construction, health care services and some activities linked to 
transportation services. It effectively did so in 1992, and by 1993 all collective agreements that 
had been signed under the previous regime expired. The new institutional setting had two major 
consequences. On one hand, it acted as an incentive for both firms and workers to negotiate at 
more decentralized levels, particularly at the firm level. On the other hand, it meant collective 
                                                           
3 PIT is the Spanish acronym for the Workers’ Inter-Union Plenary. 
  11agreements no longer had mandatory extension to all firms within the sector. As a result, 
membership in the central union has declined dramatically since then. This, however, does not 
mean unionization per se diminished at that rate, but that the synchronization, coordination and 
political bargaining power of the Central Union deteriorated. 
 
2.2. The Nature and Structure of Bargaining 
 
In the early 1990s there were more than 300 trade unions in Uruguay. They represented workers 
from specific economic activities but sometimes only included those employees belonging to a 
single firm. These unions were further organized in federations that constituted, in turn, the 
central union. Negotiations were taken over by the federations or groups of unions of the same 
economic sector. The role of the central union, apart from its political weight, has been generally 
one of coordinating the claims of all unions and federations. Employers, on the other hand, 
organized in associations in order to bargain with unions. 
  A distinctive characteristic of Uruguayan trade unions is the lack of any regulation 
regarding their constitution, the bargaining process itself and the possible channels through 
which conflicts may be solved. As a consequence, no legal rules refer to any aspect of the 
agreements, such as length of the contracts, issues over which to negotiate, or schedules for 
future negotiations. However, bargaining over minimum wages by occupation has always been 
undertaken at the wage councils. They have generally set which practice will be followed to raise 
wages as well as the amount of wage increases. In the 1980s and at the beginning of the 1990s, 
indexation of wages to the inflation rate was done combining the past and the expected 
(according to the government’s forecast) rate of inflation.
4  Coordination and synchronization of 
the negotiations helped to keep wage differentials by economic sectors quite stable in the sub-
period. Afterwards, as enforceability vanished and bargaining at the firm level began to be a 
common practice, negotiated wage increases followed a wide variety of rules, depending on the 
degree of competition firms and sectors faced and on the evolution of their relative prices, as 
well as on the bargaining power of the particular trade union. 
The analysis of all contracts signed up to 1992 shows that other issues have also been part 
of the bargaining agenda (see Cassoni, Allen and Labadie, 2000b; Ermida, Cedrola, Raso et al., 
                                                           
4 For a discussion on the type of contracts signed in the period 1985-1991 and their macroeconomic effects, see 
Forteza, 1992.  
  121998; and Rodríguez, Cozzano, Mazzuchi et al., 1998). Rules related to working conditions, such 
as length of the workg week, paid holidays, job stability, or annual extra premia, were generally 
found in collective agreements. Some unions also set hourly wages for overtime work higher 
than the legally stipulated rates. Other clauses that were sometimes included relate to the position 
at the firm of union leaders and the available means of solving conflicts. All these clauses, 
however, do not determine directly the level of employment. Most of them may further be 
translated into non-wage labor costs. Moreover, although strikes have historically acted as a 
means of discouraging employers from firing workers, there are no collective contracts in which 
the parties explicitly reached an agreement on the number of jobs.  
In the mid-1990s contracts began to include two new types of conditions: those regulating 
the introduction of new technology—essentially, how to put in practice training programs and 
mechanisms to reduce the workforce—and those determining premia linked to productivity 
gains. This sort of clauses reflected two facts: first, the new economic conditions faced by firms, 
in a framework of increased foreign competition that required investment in technologies more 
capital and skill intensive and second, the workers’ renewed worry about employment stability. 
Simultaneously, and linked to these two facts, negotiations at the firm level are known to have 
included bargaining over employment (Rodríguez, Cozzano, Mazzuchi et al., 1998). Contracts 
signed at the firm level were many times a complement to collective agreements governing the 
whole sector. That is, they could either modify some clauses of the general agreement or add 
others, especially those related to employment stability.  
 
2.3. Union Membership and Union Density 
 
The affiliation rate once unions were legally re-organized in 1985 was around 26 percent for the 
economy as a whole, with variations by economic sector. Traditionally, public workers have 
always had a higher affiliation rate than private workers, and this remained so in the 1980s and 
1990s. Among private activities, those related to the manufacturing and construction industries 
have shown the highest union density (Table 1). 
The temporal evolution of the affiliation rate shows the previously mentioned decline of 
membership to the central union. Membership, as reported in the annual congresses, has 
systematically gone down, so that in the last national congress the number of central union 
  13members was only 165,000 (around 15 percent of employment) compared to 250,000 in 1985.
5 
Although membership to the central union has diminished continuously, unionized workers have 
not necessarily become an extinct species. Many unions have stopped participating in the 
national confederation but continued to act as representatives of workers in an economic sub-
sector or even at a firm.
6  
 
Table 1. Union Membership 1985-1997 
(percentages) 
Union  Density  1985 1987 1990 1993 1997 
Agriculture, leverage & fishing 18.3 14.3 13.7 6.4  3.9
Manufacturing 32.9 27.3 23.0 25.3  16.6
Electricity, gas & water 79.0 85.4 91.1 91.6  93.7
Construction 28.9 16.4 17.1 10.0  5.2
Commerce 6.5 6.1 4.7 3.1  2.6
Transport & communications   32.3 35.4 32.9 19.9  19.7
Banking & services to firms  26.0 32.4 28.9 20.3 20.1
Social & personal services  20.9 22.3 21.7 20.9  19.1
   
Private sector 19.4 16.7 14.2 10.0  7.2
Public sector 48.4 42.0 42.3 48.5  47.3
Total  25.8 22.6 20.4 17.3 14.7 
    Note: Membership is obtained from the National Congresses held in each of the reported years. Union  
    density is defined as the ratio of membership to total employment in each sector. 
    Sources: Various newspapers, according to data reported by the Central Union (PIT-CNT); Household  
    Surveys, National Institute of Statistics. 
While the decline in union participation is substantial in the private sector, it is not so for 
public activities. Among the former, workers in primary sectors, as well as those in the 
manufacturing and construction industries have registered the highest de-unionization rates. A 
possible explanation for the evolution of membership in the primary and manufacturing sector is 
that commercial liberalization and increased competitiveness have set a limit on wage increases 
as employment stability has been at stake. They have further forced a huge restructuring of many 
firms and even of some industries as a whole. As a consequence, jobs have been lost and workers 
have found bargaining at a decentralized level more profitable for achieving their goals. This 
might also be the case for the construction industry, although in this case as the result of an 
increased degree of informality in the industry.  
                                                           
5 The figures reported in 1985 cannot be taken as exact measures of membership due to the fact the different unions 
had a number of representatives at the national congress linked to the reported number of affiliates. This fact acted 
as an incentive to upwardly bias the real figure.  
6 Workers in the frozen meat industry and those belonging to the major firm producing beer are examples of these 
two cases, respectively. 
  14Agreements signed at the firm or plant level have existed since 1985. However, their 
number was negligible until the 1990s. During the period 1985-1989, 94 percent of all contracts 
were signed at the industry level, while the percentage declined to 34 percent by 1997. Two 
percent of contracts, although signed between the trade union and the employers’ association, 
and no longer enforceable, covered only those firms and workers effectively represented at the 
bargaining table. Thus, while membership went down dramatically, the new structure of 
bargaining meant an even larger decline in the coverage of collective agreements (Rodríguez, 
Cozzano, Mazzuchi et al., 1998), so that coverage in 1997 was only 23 percent compared to 
almost 90 percent in 1990, as is shown in Table 2.
7  As a result membership and coverage have 
become very similar concepts since 1997.   
 
Table 2. Membership and Coverage, 1990 and 1997 
(percentages) 
 Membership Coverage
 1990 1997 1990 1997
Manufacturing 23 17 83 17
Commerce  5 2.5  91 6 
Services  26 21 91 25 
Total  20 15 88 23 
              Source: Rodríguez, Cozzano, Mazzuchi et al., 1998. 
 
2.4. Unions within the Manufacturing Sector in Uruguay 
 
Union density has always varied among the different manufacturing industries under study 
(Table 3). There are industries, such as textiles and leather or metal products, in which union 
density has gone down from very high levels in 1985 (60 percent) to less than 15 percent in 
1996. On the other hand, the decline has been less severe in the paper and printing industry and 
especially in oil and chemicals. The latter is an exceptional case, given it includes a large 
publicly owned firm, and the decrease in unionization in the public sector has not been as sharp 
as in the private sector.  
 
                                                           
7 The percentages were calculated analysing contracts that were registered at the Ministry of Labor. As the parties 
were not obliged by law to register these contracts, the figures cannot be considered definitive. 















1985 45.13  65.86  46.87  67.22  35.08  68.17 
1986 42.71  59.54  43.25  62.45  32.59  59.69 
1987 44.35  45.06  36.91  60.52  20.29  33.50 
1988 42.72  43.86  34.10  57.32  17.33  26.56 
1989 41.74  42.82  34.58  57.44  17.67  27.37 
1990 39.70  33.08  27.36  57.36  9.01  28.77 
1991 41.00  35.19  29.53  63.24  8.76  29.32 
1992 44.02  39.21  29.89  68.33  8.77  31.88 
1993 25.75  21.72  27.64  51.18  7.33  25.24 
1994 26.26  24.93  32.08  55.98  7.94  28.37 
1995 28.03  29.58  33.70  55.86  9.43  30.41 
1996 21.48  13.42  24.91  50.22  7.31  9.75 
1997 21.50  13.05  27.17  51.69  7.78  9.64 
1998 22.06  14.09  28.28  53.41  8.18  10.17 
1999 23.48  17.17  29.96  58.95  11.04  10.57 
          Sources: Various newspapers, according to data reported by the Central Union (PIT-CNT), 
               Household Surveys, National Institute of Statistics. 
 
The most significant decline started in the 1990s, when the government stopped 
participating in negotiations and agreements ceased to be enforceable. After the change in the 
rules of the game, there was an increase in the number of collective agreements signed at the 
plant or firm level (Table 4). 
 
                                   Table 4. Firm-level agreements by industry 
                            (Number of ongoing agreements and percentage workers covered by them)  












Year  FLA %L FLA %L FLA  %L FLA %L FLA %L FLA  %L
1985  1  0.4 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0  0.0 
1986  1  0.4 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0  0.0 
1987  2  0.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0  0.0 
1988  3  0.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 1.4 1 0.5 0  0.0 
1989  3  0.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 1.5 2 2.6 0  0.0 
1990  3  0.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 1.7 2 2.6 0  0.0 
1991  4  0.6 2 1.2 1 7.1 1 1.9 2 2.4 0  0.0 
1992  6  0.6 3 1.3 2  14.1  1 2.0 2 2.3 0  0.0 
1993  8  2.3 4 1.5 2  13.7  1 2.0 2 2.2 2  0.0 
1994  15 2.4 4 1.7 2  15.0  1 1.9 2 2.5 2  0.0 
1995  15 2.5 4 2.1 2  15.6  1 1.8 2 2.8 2  0.0 
1996  22 6.3 6 6.2 4  19.3  2 2.2 2 2.9 4  0.4 
Note: FLA is the number of firm-level agreements in the industry; %L is the percentage of workers covered by 
them. 
Source: Database on collective agreements, Industrial Survey, National Institute of Statistics. 
 
  16Consistent with the observed decline in unionization, the analysis of the data stemming 
from the 1996 special purpose survey indicates that half of the manufacturing firms were not 
bound by any collective agreement in 1996. The percentage, however, decreases with firm size, 
although rising again for the largest firms (more than 100 workers). That is, de-unionization has 
left uncovered by collective agreements mostly those workers in small firms (Table 5). The 
result must be linked to the fact that firm-level agreements are more often found in large than in 
small firms. 
 











<10  74.1 1.7  24.1  0 
10-29  61.7 10.2  25.8  2.3 
30-49  56.0 13.3  24.0  6.7 
50-99  35.9 17.5  38.8  7.8 
100+  45.0 22.9  19.3  12.9 
Total 52.4  14.7  26.2  6.7 
   Source: Firm Strategies and Employment Policy Survey, Department of  
                 Economics, University of Uruguay. 
 
Small firms (with fewer than 30 workers) tend to have agreements at the industry level. 
This is particularly true in industries like paper and printing, non-metallic minerals and metal 
products. Further, it is a significant trend in firms that export between 26 percent and 60 percent 
of their production, but not necessarily in those that export a proportion even higher than that 
figure. Only 40 percent of the 40 firms that export 75 percent or more of their production report 
having some kind of collective agreement, while 67 percent of the 88 that export less than 25 
percent report having collective agreements. This proportion is higher for those that export 
between 26-50 percent of their products (85.7 percent). Hence, together with the trend of having 
collective agreements at the industry or firm level for those that export between one fourth and 
two-thirds of their production, there is a trend towards not having collective agreements among 
those that export most of their production. With slight differences, the situation is similar when 
only the level of exports to Mercosur is considered. 
Finally, regarding the inclusion of employment clauses, they are more frequently found 
among agreements signed by firms with 10-30 employees, and among those that export 25-50 
  17percent of their production; that also being the case when only exports to Mercosur are 
considered. 
 
3. Theoretical and Empirical Models 
 
In order to model union behavior the literature has either used the monopoly union model, 
assuming that unions have the power to impose their preferred wage target on the firm, which 
then determines employment from its labor demand curve (see Pencavel, 1991), or it has used a 
bargaining model. The conceptual issues that bargaining models pose, are related to: a) what do 
the parties bargain over? (wages, employment, other issues); b) what are the union preferences 
and objective function?; and c) whether bargaining takes place sequentially, over wages first, and 
then over labor, or is there “efficient bargaining”  over wages and employment at the same time. 
In the case where the level of employment is set by the firm once wages have been 
bargained over, a right-to-manage model must be specified. This model is particularly appealing 
when negotiations over wages take place at the industry level, since it is rather obvious that 
employment cannot be bargained at that level (at least at the same time), fitting the Uruguayan 
case for the period until 1993. On the other hand, when bargaining takes place at the firm level, 
and the unions’ objective functions seem to be changing as has been described, sequential 
models, of which the “efficient bargaining model” is a particular case, could be more suitable.
8 
This could be the case for Uruguay by the mid-1990s, when bargaining stopped being a process 
involving all workers simultaneously, while employment emerged as a possible additional target 
of negotiations. Hence, from a theoretical point of view, one could translate the above changes 
into specifying two different bargaining models depending on the time period. 
The dataset includes only 4 years of observations from each sub-period. Hence, and in 
spite of the above, it is preferable to assume that only wages are the result of bargaining, while 
the determination of employment, investment, productivity and profitability is afterwards done 
according to different models and subject to the bargained wage. However, in order not to rule 
out any possible direct effect of unions on these variables, proxies for union power are included 
in the mentioned models, following a methodology similar to that sketched in Boal and Pencavel 
(1994). 
                                                           
8 Efficient contracts are a particular case of sequential models, foe example, when the bargaining power of unions 
over employment and wages are the same (Manning, 1987). 
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3.1 The Model for Wages and Employment 
 
The model postulated implies that in a first stage employers and workers bargain over the wage 
level at the industry level. Once the wage is set, the firm/establishment decides a wage level that 
might differ from that bargained depending on its specific characteristics.
9 Afterwards, the firm 
sets the level of employment according to its labor demand function. 
The utility function of unions is derived from a median voter framework, assuming that 
they maximize a surplus over an alternative income w
a. Union members care about the real wage 
in terms of the consumption price index. The alternative income is linked to average earnings in 
the informal sector, average unemployment benefits and wages in other industries in the previous 
time period.
10 Let the utility functions of the parties be as follows: 
 
Unions:        Γ(wt, w
a
t, cpt, cpt-1, Lt)  = [(w/cp)t - (w
a/cp)t-1]*Lt
φ 
Employers:  Π(Qt, Lt, Kt, pt, wt, pct) = ptQt - wtLt - pctKt 
 
where w/cp is the real wage; w
a/cp is the alternative income in terms of the price of consumption 
goods; L is employment; p is the product price; Q is production; pc is the price of capital services 
and K is the capital level. 
Hence, the generalized Nash bargaining problem implies the maximization of the weighted 
product of the utility function of the players, minus their respective fallback positions. These are 
assumed to be zero (Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky, 1986),
11 while the weights are given by the 
bargaining power of the parties. The resulting expression is as follows: 
 
   Max  Υ = (Γ-Γ0)
β (Π-Π0)
1-β 
          w 
 
                                                           
9 Before 1992, they were able to set a wage higher or equal to that bargained, since government compulsorily 
enforced the agreed wage on all firms in the sector. After that date, smaller wage increases relative to the negotiated 
ones were also possible. 
10 The relevant measure for the alternative wage refers to the time period prior to bargaining. Thus, it has to be 
deflated by the consumption price index of that same period (cpt-1). 
11 In the event of no agreement there would be a strike. Then the firm will have no operating profits and union 
members will have zero earnings, as there are no legal provisions assuring any income to strikers in Uruguay.  
  19Subject to the assumption that the capital level is given, once bargaining over the wage occur, the 
solution to the Nash bargain yields an equation for the wage at the industry level as follows 
(Pencavel, 1991: 120; Booth, 1995: 154):  
 
(w/pp) j,t = η(φ,β)*f[(w
a/cp)j, t -1, (pp/cp)j,t]    “j” indexes the industries, “t” indexes the year 
 
where η(φ,β) is the mark-up over the alternative income and the functional form for “f” depends 
on the production function assumed. Since unions care about the real wage in terms of 
consumption goods while firms are interested in the cost of labor relative to the price of their 
products, the wedge between those two prices also enters the wage equation. The bargaining 
power of the union cannot be observed. Thus, it is here assumed that it is a function of union density 
(U) and the structure of bargaining (%FLB). Market conditions, on the other hand, may set a limit to 
union action. Hence, other variables (X) are also considered as determining union power, such as 
the degree of exposure to competition; the occurrence of external shocks; or the degree of 
international trade of the industry. The solution of the maximization problem results in a 
bargained wage level for each industry “j” as given by: 
 
(w/pp)j,t = η(Xj,t, %FLBj,t, Uj,t)*f[(w
a/cp) j ,t-1, (pp/cp)j,t]              (1) 
 
If it is further considered that each firm “i” can set a wage in each time period “t” that 
differs from the bargained wage level depending on its individual characteristics, its relative size 
or market power, and its exposure to foreign competition, the equation for wages at the 
establishment level can be written as: 
 
(wi,j/ppj)t = η(Xj,t, %FLBj,t, Uj,t)*f[(w
a/cp) j ,t-1, (pp/cp)j,t]  + d(Yi,j,t, Xj,t, Z t)  (2) 
 
where d(.,.,.)  refers to the establishment wage differential, a function of its own specific 
characteristics (Yi,j,t) as well as of industry (Xj,t) and macroeconomic (Zt) variables. 
Unobservable characteristics of the establishments are taken into account using individual fixed 
effects.  
Establishments are assumed to use a technology with two inputs, capital and labor. 
Maximization of profits thus yields a two-equation system of derived demands, given the price 
of inputs. Employment at the firm level is thus determined according to a standard labor demand 
  20equation, so that it is a function of the wage set, the level of capital and market conditions. Also 
included in the equation, however, are variables accounting for union density and the structure of 
bargaining, in order to allow for the possibility that negotiations on employment may also take 
place. The inclusion of these variables is tested for only in the last three years, when the 
bargaining regime changed. The estimated model is thus: 
 
Li,j,t = f[wi,j,t/ppj,t, Ki,j,t, %FLBj,t, Uj,t, Yi,j ,t, Xj,t, Z t)        (3) 
 
3.2. The Model for Investment 
 
It is assumed that firms make their investment decisions prior to setting the wage and the 
employment level, this being done by negotiating with the union or not. Therefore, the firm has 
to consider that the union will try to capture quasi-rents from capital as well, depending on its 
bargaining power. This has been generally seen as an effective increase in the price of capital, as 
if unions were able to tax investment. The known result of under-investment stemming from the 
fact that a cooperative bargaining output is unlikely, given the length of contracts in relation to 
the life of capital (Grout, 1984; Dow, 1993), is not, however, the only possible one (Hirsch and 
Prasad, 1995). Actually, the factor mix in a unionized firm may be identical to that in a non-
union setting, as both labor and capital prices can be distorted. As in the case of labor, no definite 
empirical proof can be performed to decide on the correct bargaining model, as both sequential 
and efficient models are compatible with the same results. Given this, only union variables are 
included in the specification and the statistical significance of their estimated coefficients is 
tested for. In order to obtain a simple estimable model for the investment level, a Cobb-Douglas 
production function is assumed. Given the model for wages and employment determination and 
assuming there are adjustment costs,
12 it is possible to specify a model for the level of investment 
as in Machin and Wadhwani (1991) of the form: 
 
Ii,j,t = f(dqi,j,t, %FLBj,t, Uj,t, pcj,t/wi,j,t, Yi,j,t  Xj,t, Z t)       (4) 
 
where for year “t”, Ii,j,t is the level of investment of the firm; dqi,j,t denotes product growth at the 
firm level; %FLBj,t refers to the extent of firm-level bargaining in the industry; Uj,t is a measure 
of union power at the industry level; and pcj/wi,j,t is the price of capital services relative to the 
                                                           
12 Adjustment costs are a function of unionization, investment and specific characteristics of the establishment. 
  21firm’s labor costs. Yi,j,t refers to variables accounting for firm-specific characteristics; Xj,t denotes 
industry-specific variables; and Z t is a vector of macroeconomic variables.  
  As the level of investment is generally related to absolute size of the plant and/or the 
existence of capital, the same equation is also estimated, but instead using the rate of investment 
as dependent variable: 
 
Ii,j,t /Ki,t-1  = f(dqi,j,t, %FLBj,t, Uj,t, pcj,t/wi,j,t, Yi,j,t, Xj,t, Zt)      (4’) 
 
3.3. The Model for Productivity 
 
The role of unions is generally sketched as that of a rent-seeking agent. However, the firm may 
be willing to accept sharing extraordinary profits in exchange for increasing productivity. In this 
sense, unions can have another face, that of productivity-enhancing agents. This can be derived 
from assuming that the advent of unionism forces management to increase efficiency, or from 
the notion that unions promote higher morale and cooperation among the working teams 
(Freeman and Medoff, 1979). These opposite views make the empirical analysis of the effects of 
unions on productivity even more necessary. Other possible effects are related to the decrease in 
the turnover rate and hence in its associated costs for the firm and also to all productivity gains 
derived from increased effort at the workplace. 
In order to study how unions affect productivity, an equation of productivity 
determination is derived from the production function. Assuming a Cobb-Douglas methodology:   
 
ln(Qi,j,t/Li,j,t) =  ci,j + αln(Ki,j,t/Li,j,t) + βln(Mi,j ,t/Li,j,t) + δYi,j,t + γXj,t  + λZ t    (5) 
 
where cij are firm-specific effects; Ki,j,t refers to the capital stock; Li,j,t is employment; and Mi,j,t 
are raw materials. Variables in Yi,j,t refer to firm-specific characteristics; those in Xj,t account for 
industry-specific characteristics, including union density and the structure of bargaining; and 
those in Z t capture macroeconomic performance affecting productivity.  
  Several econometric problems are associated with this model.
13 First, omission of other 
unobservable variables that affect labor productivity, and that are in turn correlated with the 
union variable, would bias the estimated effect of unions. This could be avoided by estimating 
the effects of unions on productivity growth. Unobservable individual characteristics would be 
                                                           
13 Booth (1995) provides a list.   
  22considered but they would disappear in the dynamic version of equation (5). Another strategy is 
to estimate the model in levels but transforming all variables to deviations from the sample 
mean. Second, endogeneity bias could arise from the fact that unions might tend to organize in 
those establishments where monopoly power is greater and hence extra profits are more likely to 
be obtained. To account for this effect, variables reflecting monopoly power and international 
exposure of the industries are included. Finally, estimates might be subject to simultaneity bias if 
bargained wages alter the level of inputs in the right hand side of the equation. This issue can be 
addressed by estimating the productivity equation as a system including wage and employment 
equations. Alternatively, variables can be properly instrumented, which is the strategy followed 
here. 
  Also estimated are the possible effects of union density on the rate of productivity 
growth, using an equation analogous to that of the productivity level. If unions originally 
concentrate in sectors or establishments with the highest rate of profits, which in turn can be the 
consequence of being the most productive ones, then it might be the case that they are positively 
correlated with the level of productivity but negatively correlated with its rate of growth. The 
model analogous to equation (5) is (5’): 
 
ln(Qi,j,t/Li,j,t) - ln(Qi,j,t-1/Li,j,t-1) = cij + α[ln(Ki,j,t/Li,j,t) - ln(Ki,j,t-1/Li,j,t-1)] +  
    +   β[ln(Mi,j,t/Li,j,t) - ln(Mi,j,t-1/Li,j,t-1)] + δYi,j,t + γXj,t + λZt  (5’) 
 
3.4. The Model for Profitability 
 
Unions are expected to reduce the profitability of firms given their rent-seeking activity. 
However, the structure of the product market in which firms operate is the main determinant of 
the existence of any profit. When there is bargaining, whatever the level of supernormal rents, 
the extent to which owners of the firm or the union can appropriate these rents will depend on 
their bargaining power. A further determinant of the existence of extra surplus is related to the 
amount of innovation. Although it is sometimes argued that this surplus is just a normal return to 
investment in R&D, unions need not share this view. Some authors also argue that unions’ share 
in innovation is captured by higher wages (Van Reenen, 1995), so that it is necessary to estimate 
the wage equation together with the model for profits. On the other hand, if the effects of unions 
on productivity are positive, then they might be increasing profitability. The proposed analysis of 
the above issues is done by estimating the direct effect of unions on some indicator of profits, 
  23taking into account the structure of the market the firm operates in; the extent to which the firm 
is subject to binding foreign competition; union density; and the degree of decentralization of 
bargaining. Adequate instruments for the wage are also included in order to avoid simultaneity 
biases, since wages and profits are jointly determined. The estimable equation is: 
 
                Profiti,j,t  = g(wi,j,t/pj,t, %FLBj,t, Uj,t ,Yi,j,t, Xj,t, Zt)                      (6) 
 
As was mentioned in the case of productivity, sectors with the highest union density might be 
found in those establishments or sectors with the highest level of profits. Following the same 
strategy as before, also estimated is an equation for the rate of growth of profitability, that is 
specified analogously to equation (6): 
 
        Profiti,j,t - Profiti,j,t-1 = g[(wi,j,t/pj,t)-(wi,j,t-1/pj,t-1)], %FLBj,t, Uj,t ,Yi,j,t, Xj,t, Zt}            (6’) 
 
 
4. Description of the Sample, Variables Used and Models Specified 
 
4.1 The Sample 
 
The units of observation are the manufacturing establishments surveyed by the National Institute 
of Statistics on an annual basis during the period 1988 to 1995. There were 842 establishments in 
1988, the base year. Many of them closed for good along those years, while others, after 
remaining closed for a year or two re-opened with another owner. There were also births along 
the period, although many of these establishments did not survive. As a consequence, the total 
number of establishments surveyed in 1995 equals 646. Table 6 describes the distribution of the 
establishments in the sample according to their status. Annex 1 reports descriptive statistics for 
the whole sample, yearly and according to this classification. Establishments that survived 
without any change in ownership during the period under analysis are only 50 percent of the 
sample. Unsuccessful establishments, that is, those that ended closing regardless of their original 
status, account for 27 percent of the sample.   
 
  24Table 6. Distribution of Establishments According to Survival Status, 1988 -1995 
  Number of  
Observations 
Number of  
Establishments 
Percentage 
Alive during the whole period  3,832  479  50.0 
Born in the period and surviving  216  49  5.1 
Born in the period and dead  11  5  0.5 
Dead in the period  1,058  234  24.4 
Alive, dead, rebirth and surviving  700  169  17.6 
Alive, dead, rebirth and dead  60  22  2.3 
      
Total 5877  958  100.0 
Source: Industrial Survey, National Institute of Statistics. 
 
Establishments in the sample belong to 37 different industries at the 3 ISIC digit level, 
except for food, beverage and tobacco, which is dealt with at the 4-digit level due to the 
heterogeneity of its sub-markets. The observations are not expanded, so that the results obtained 
with the dataset cannot be taken as representative for all establishments in the industry. However, 
all establishments with more than 50 employees are included in the sample, so that the results 
must be viewed with particular caution in regard to small establishments. 
 
4.2 The Variables 
 
Data on all variables referring to establishment characteristics stem from the Annual Industrial 
Survey, performed by the National Institute of Statistics. These are: value added, gross output, 
value of sales, employment, wages, taxes, exports, value of raw materials, investment, 
depreciation, and profits. Variables are measured in pesos and are therefore deflated by the 
appropriate price index when necessary. Product prices, capital prices and export prices are not 
reported at the establishment level, so that industry-level prices are used instead. 
Wages paid are not the relevant variable for firm decision making, as there are other costs 
linked to the labor input that are also considered. Hence, a cost of labor variable is used instead 
of wages adding all non-wage costs to the wage. These costs refer to social security and health 
insurance contributions, payroll taxes and annual extra payments. The legal cost of labor is further 
multiplied by a bargained non-wage costs index, stemming from the manufacturing collective 
agreements signed between 1988 and 1995 following the methodology described in Cassoni, 
Allen and Labadie (2000).  
  25Temporal data on capital are not available. However, the 1988 Industrial Census did 
request information on capital stock. There have been various unsuccessful attempts to calculate 
a time series using the 1988 stock together with annual depreciation, investment and assets sold. 
The reasons behind this fact are probably linked to the accounting policy of firms. 
Overestimation of the amount of depreciation is avoided by calculating an average depreciation 
rate by type of asset—building, machinery and others—by industrial sector and by year. The 
resulting depreciation rate is then used for all firms within each sector yearly. Further excluded is 
the value of assets sold in the measure of capital, assuming assets have been totally depreciated 
when sold.












i,j,t-1   for c = machinery, buildings, other assets 




j,t =  ∑ i D
c




where K is the capital stock; I refers to the amount of investment; δ is the depreciation rate; and 
D is the amount of depreciation. 
Union density is defined as the affiliation rate of the industry at the 3 ISIC digit level. The 
time series is built using data on membership reported by the central union in each congress and 
dividing this figure by total employment. It is important to note that, given the data available, 
measured here are the effects of unionization at the industry level on the performance of the 
establishments that operate in that industry. Nevertheless, since wage bargaining was done at the 
industry level during most of the period the use of union density at this same level is adequate. 
Its effects on the performance of establishments, however, must not be thought of as relative to 
non-union establishments but as relative to establishments in non-union industries. 
The bargaining models to be used assume that unions negotiate a mark-up over an 
alternative wage. This alternative wage can also be thought of as the opportunity cost of working or 
reservation wage, if no bargaining model is assumed. The alternative income for a worker in 
industry “j” is defined as the weighted average of what he/she would earn if hired by a firm in the 
manufacturing sector; the income the worker would receive if he/she becomes unemployed and 
collects unemployment benefits (50 percent of his/her last wage received); and the average income 
                                                           
14 This methodology is close to that used in Black and Lynch (1997).  
  26of self-employed individuals, under the assumption that if the worker cannot find a job in the formal 
sector, he/she would prefer to undertake an informal job instead of remaining unemployed. At the 
establishment level, however, the exact calculation is not possible. Thus included are the variables 
defining the reservation wage directly. The weights are a function of the unemployment rate and the 
average duration of the unemployment spell. Thus, the variables that have to be included are the 
income in the informal sector and its product with the unemployment rate and by duration of 
unemployment. The relevant measure to be considered when bargaining takes place is not the 
current alternative income, which is not known at the time of negotiation, but that prevailing in the 
previous time period.  
Using the variables defined above, other indicators are built: 
1.  Investment rate: level of investment in year “t” divided by capital at the 
beginning of the year. 
2.  Productivity: gross output divided by number of workers 
3.  Profitability: profits divided by sales 
4.  Export share in total sales 
5.    Capital per worker: capital in machinery divided by number of workers 
6.        Relative size of the establishment: gross product of the establishment 
divided by the industry gross product. The indicator can also be taken as a 
measure of relative monopoly power of the plant. 
 
Market conditions are also considered. First, the degree of concentration of the industry 
(C4), calculated as the ratio of total sales of the 4 biggest establishments to total sales of the 
industry. Second, measures of the relative exposure of the industry to foreign competition, both 
locally and internationally. Thus five time series are built so as to account for trade liberalization:  
 
1.  The ratio of imports to total consumption (GDP - exports + imports) in 
1988 prices, as an index of import penetration at the industry level, which 
accounts for sectoral external shocks.  
2.  The share of exports in total sales in 1988 prices at the industry level, also 
to proxy sectoral shocks.  
  273.  The share of regional exports in total exports and the share of regional 
imports over total imports in order to account for the relative importance 
in trade of those countries in the region.  
4.  Relative prices, defined as the local relative price for each sector (PPI of 
the industry divided by the price index for non-tradables) divided by 
international prices. 
 
Finally, the degree of openness of the economy as a whole, which should be a 
fundamental factor affecting firm performance in the Uruguayan case, is also considered. 
Openness has been proxied in the literature using various indicators. In general, these can be 
classified in two groups: those accounting for the results of trade liberalization on the amount of 
production subject to trade; and those reflecting the level of price distortion. Among the former 
group, one criticism that must be overcome is that related to not measuring quantities in constant 
prices, as the variations in the relative price of tradables/non-tradables would distort the real 
index (Low, Olarreaga and Suárez, 1999). Second, the relative size of the tradable sector will 
also generate biases. Among the indicators of degree of openness based on price distortions the 
real exchange rate is one of the most popular. However, its use has been extensively criticized as 
it reflects other phenomena at the same time (see Rodrik and Rodríguez, 1999). Berlinski (1999) 
proposed an alternative measure based on relative prices between export and import substitutive 
sectors in an economy. These in turn depend on the international price and the exchange rate, as 
well as on local trade policy. Hence, all sources of distortions are included in the indicator. 
Vaillant (2001) has calculated the time series for Uruguay and shown that its evolution is very 
similar to the analogous time series based on quantities.
15  
 
4.3 Model Specification and Estimation Methods 
 
All the models described in this section are specified allowing for dynamics, using only one lag 
of the dependent variable. Given the nature of the dataset used, individual effects (establishment-
specific) are also included. In order to avoid the possibility of them being correlated with the 
                                                           




*NT) t, that is local tradable to non-tradables prices 
divided by international relative prices, and this in turn equals the tariff in the base year (τ0) divided by the tariff in 
“t,” the “equivalent” tariff τt  is equal to [(1+τ0)/rpt ]-1 . 
  28predetermined variables, the models are estimated in orthogonal deviations instead of in levels, 
so that these effects are eliminated from the equations.
16,17 
Many of the predetermined variables included in the models cannot be considered strictly 
exogenous. Thus, instrumental variables methods have to be used to avoid endogeneity bias.  
Further, given that there are 8 time periods in the panel and lagged endogenous variables, it is 
also necessary to estimate taking into account the specific form of the variance-covariance 
matrix. Hence, in order to achieve consistency and asymptotic efficiency, the estimation method 
used is the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), which has been shown to be a method that 
provides the optimum set of instruments (see, for example, Arellano and Bover, 1990 or 
Arellano and Bond, 1991). The software to be used is the DPD (Arellano and Bond, 1998). 
In spite of the fact that endogeneity bias can be considerable, also reported is the output 
of estimation by Generalized Least Squares (GLS), with fixed effects by industry and a time 
trend. The exercise is intended to further validate the output of the GMM estimation, since it is 
known that the results when using instrumental variables methods are quite sensitive to the set of 
instruments chosen. Instruments for the wage are nevertheless retained in those equations where 
it appears as an independent variable, in order to be consistent with the theoretical models 
proposed. The estimated effect of unions on the different indicators of firm performance is of the 
same sign when estimating the models in levels, except for the employment equation. Statistical 
significance, however, is not always found. Regarding the estimation in orthogonal deviations, 
effects go in the same direction for the models explaining wages, productivity, productivity 
growth, and profitability. The opposite is found in the models for investment, employment and 
profitability growth but in no case are statistically significant coefficients obtained. The   
conclusion is thus that the results obtained using the GMM methodology are robust enough. The 
output of the GLS regressions is reported in Annex 2.  
Since the estimation period is 1988-1995, different bargaining models were not estimated 
for the sub-periods resulting from the change in the institutional framework that took place in 
1992, as temporal observations in the dataset are not enough. However, dummy variables were 
                                                           
16 The correlation between individual effects and predetermined variables is expected. As an example, consider the 
implausibility of having independence between management skills and relative size of the establishment, or export 
share.   
17 Orthogonal deviations of xi,t are proposed in Arellano (1988) as deviations from average future observations, 
according to:  
  x
*
i,t = [xi,t – (1/T-t)(xi,t+1 –....+ xi,T)][/(T-t)/(T-t-1)]
1/2 for t=1,...T-1 
  29included allowing for a change in the impact of union density and coverage of firm-level 
agreements on the different dependent variables from 1993 onwards.
18 Recent work at the 
aggregate level has shown the existence of different effects of unions on diverse variables in the 
eighties and in the nineties, pointing at 1993 as the year in which the institutional changes had an 
observable effect (Cassoni and Labadie, 2001). 
Apart from the variables entering each equation, observable establishment-specific and 
industry-specific characteristics were included in the equations for wages, employment, 
investment, productivity and profitability. The establishment-level variables used are the share of 
exports in total sales (xsales); and the relative size of the establishment (size). Industry-specific 
variables include export share (xsalesI); import penetration (maconsI); the share of regional 
exports in total exports (%regxI); the share of regional imports in total imports (%regmI); a 
concentration index (C4); the union affiliation rate (%unionI); and the percentage of workers in 
the industry that are covered by firm/establishment agreements (%flbI). Finally, the previously 
defined price indicator of the overall degree of openness in the economy is also included 
(etariff). 
The set of instruments used for the control variables at the economy, industry or 
establishment level is the same for all equations. These are the ratio of domestic to international 
sectoral prices (xpriceI), serving as instrument for establishment and industry export share, as 
well as for industry import penetration. The equivalent tariff is considered exogenous and thus 
included as an instrument. Instruments used for the relative size of the establishment, for the 
degree of concentration of the market, union density, and the extent of coverage of firm-level 
agreements are all possible lags of the same variables. When the model includes the lagged 
dependent variable, all lags starting with the second lag are included as instruments as well. 
Regarding the variables that are specific to each model, they are all considered endogenous, so 




Estimated results are summarized in Table 7. Regarding the wage equation, the effects of the 
average income in the informal sector and its product with the duration of the unemployment 
                                                           
18 Cassoni, Allen and Labadie (2000) have shown that the data signals at 1993 as the period in which the 
institutional change is reflected in the evolution of wages and employment. 
  30spell and the unemployment rate have the expected signs, that is, positive for the former and 
negative for the latter two. The wage elasticity of the wedge between production and 
consumption prices is –0.63, reflecting that product wages go down whenever this wedge 
increases as unions bargain over real wages in terms of consumption goods. Bigger 
establishments pay higher wages relative to the rest. Workers in establishments of exporting 
industries and in those that operate in more concentrated markets also receive higher pay than 
others, while the reverse holds in import-substituting industries. However, if imports come from 
the region, the negative effect on wages vanishes. Interestingly, the more open the economy (the 
lower the equivalent tariff) the higher the wage level. This result has also been found in other 
research (see Cassoni and Labadie, 2001) and is linked to the fact that growth in the Uruguayan 
case is highly dependent on the evolution of exports, so that overall growth and openness are 
almost synonymous nowadays. On the other hand, the level of establishment exports and the 
share of regional exports in total sales at the industry level have no impact on wages. Finally, 
union density is positively correlated with wages, so that full unionization in the period would 
have meant an additional real wage increase of 4.8 percent ceteris paribus, evaluated at the mean 
value of union density (0.365). The extent of coverage of firm-level agreements has no 
statistically significant effect. Neither did the variables accounting for the institutional changes in 
the 1990s. However, the estimated coefficients have the expected signs: positive in the case of 
firm-level coverage and negative in the case of those multiplying union density and firm-level 
coverage since 1993. That is, before 1993, if unions further bargained at the firm level, they 
could only increase what was agreed at the Wage Council. After that date, the effect of unions on 
wages diminished (to half its previous estimated effect) while firm-level bargaining, possibly due 
to the inclusion of employment in negotiations, further reduced wage increases. 
Labor demand depends on the price of labor relative to the product price and on the 
level of capital in machinery and equipment. Wage and capital elasticities are -0.85 and 0.10, 
respectively. A more open economy favors employment via growth, while external sectoral 
shocks, as measured by export share and import penetration are not statistically significant. 
Regional exports as a share of total exports are found to have a negative impact on employment 
levels while those establishments that increase their share of exports in total sales also increase 
employment. Bigger establishments, as well as those operating in more competitive markets, hire 
more workers than others. As in the case of wages, the extent of firm-level bargaining has no 
  31effect on employment, while no statistically significant change in the estimated coefficients in 
1993 is found. The direct effect of unions on labor demand is to increase employment (by 0.1 
percent for each 1 percent increase in union density). Given the indirect effect via wages, full 
unionization in the period would have meant a 14 percent increase in employment.  
Investment is modeled according to equation (4) and (4’) and taking into account the 
total amount of investment, that is, investment in machinery and equipment, in buildings and in 
other assets. The price of capital relative to the wage has the expected negative coefficient in 
both models while that of output growth is positive (the output elasticity is 0.2 in both models 
and the price elasticity is -0.9 in the model in levels and -0.7 in that for the rate of investment). 
While establishments with a bigger relative size invest less than the rest, when analyzing its 
impact in terms of the rate of investment, the effect vanishes. Establishments operating in 
markets that are more competitive have a higher rate and level of investment. However, increases 
in export share and in import penetration generate a decline in both the level and rate of 
investment. This could mean that foreign competition is faced using more labor-intensive 
technologies. The effect is quite expected in the case of imports, as they came mainly from the 
region until 1994, so that imported goods were intensive in unskilled labor. The destination of 
exports, on the other hand, changed at the beginning of the 1990s, from the rest of the world to 
the region, so that it might be the case that those firms already had a high level of capital and 
thus needed to invest less than the rest in relative terms. If exporting to the region, the effect is 
thus smoother. No statistically significant effect of the overall degree of openness is found. 
 




     Investment 
Level         Rate 
   Productivity 
 Level       Growth 
Profitability Rate 
Level         Growth 
Wedge  -0.523 
(0.056) 
           
Wage informal sector   0.349 
(0.060) 
           




           




           
Wage   -0.264 
(0.038) 
           -0.123 
(0.054) 
 
Capital     0.032 
(0.017) 
        
 
 




      
 




     Investment 
Level         Rate 
   Productivity 
 Level       Growth 
Profitability Rate 
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Qutput  
rate of growth 




      
Capital / employment        0.237 
(0.027) 
    
Raw materials / employment        0.650 
(0.035) 
    
Capital / employment 
 rate of growth 
         0.113 
(0.041) 
  
Raw materials / employment  
rate of growth 
         0.515 
(0.050) 
  




rate of growth 
          -0.083 
(0.047) 
Price of capital 
rate of growth 
          -0.227 
(0.138) 









(0.010)     ------     ------     ------ 
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Sargan test     0.044 0.015  0.014  0.023 0.017 0.318  0.320  0.629 
1st order autocorrelation  0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000 0.001 0.001  0.228  0.191 
2nd order autocorrelation  0.207 0.731  0.169  0.183 0.589 0.012  0.640  0.229 
Nº of observations  4849 4849  4849  4849 4849 3073  4849 3073 
      Notes:  Sargan test is that of over-identifying restrictions. Figures reported for all tests are p-values. 
 
Variables accounting for union effects are found to be statistically significant in both 
models—for the level and for the rate of investment—although no change in the estimated 
coefficients is found in 1993. Establishments in industries with higher union density and fewer 
  33workers covered by collective agreements signed at the firm level are found to invest more than 
those in other industries. The estimated elasticities are 0.3 and -0.1, respectively, being the total 
effect of unions further increased if also considering the positive indirect effect via wages (Table 
8). That is, since unions increase wages and this promotes substitution between capital and labor, 
the positive direct effect of unions on investment at the establishment level is reinforced. If 
bargaining at the firm level, however, the effect is smaller. The result is consistent with the 
structure of bargaining described in previous sections. Previous work (Cassoni and Labadie, 
2001) has shown that one of the observed effects of unions has been to promote substitution 
between blue and white-collar workers. Hence, the positive effect of unions on the level and rate 
of investment can be thought of as the result of firms moving to more capital-intensive 
technologies in order to avoid possible extra costs of union action. If negotiating at the firm 
level, however, bargaining over employment is also observed, and so it is likely that the parties 
would agree to slow down this process.  
The estimated equations for productivity and productivity growth also suggest there are 
positive direct effects of unionization at the industry level. No change in the estimated parameter 
is found in 1993. The statistical significance of the union variable in the levels equation is weak, 
while firm level bargaining is highly significant. The positive direct effect of unionism on 
productivity becomes negative when adding the estimated indirect effects via employment 
(Table 8). Regarding productivity growth, the estimated impact of unionism is such that a 10 
percent increase in membership, evaluated at the mean value of union density, implies a 0.6 
percent rise in the rate of growth of labor productivity. Full unionization, thus, would have meant 
an increase of 9 percent in the rate of growth. However, if including the indirect impact via 
employment, the total effect is nil.  
There are many theoretical explanations for a positive link between unionism and 
productivity related to increased co-operation and higher morale, as discussed in Section 3. Some 
authors have also tried to measure the typical unobservable characteristics by using special 
surveys (Black and Lynch, 1997 is an example). In the Uruguayan case, however, the result 
could also be linked to the decrease in turnover that takes place in unionized sectors (Cassoni, 
Allen and Labadie, 2000). Further, if unions induce substitution of labor by capital and new 
technologies are more efficient than the previous one, then labor productivity can be increased. 
Regarding the effect of firm-level bargaining, the positive direct effect further supports the 
  34previous argument: if bargaining over employment takes place, one should expect that an 
increased stability of jobs would raise productivity in exchange for lower turnover. 
Other variables explain the performance of firms regarding productivity. The relative size 
of the establishment and the degree of openness of the economy are variables that have a positive 
effect both on the level and the rate of growth of labor productivity. Belonging to industries 
facing more competitive pressure via import penetration lowers productivity, while competing in 
foreign markets via exports raises productivity growth. The result, again, can be understood if 
the origin of imports and the destiny of exports are taken into account. During most of this period 
imported goods came mainly from countries in Mercosur. Given the common external tariff 
established by regional agreements, and considering the type of goods imported, it could well be 
that the regional agreements operated as a subsidy within the region. Hence, products coming 
from neighbor countries belonged to industries that were not competitive with the rest of the 
world but that were competitive with local industries at least until 1994 (see Section 1). At the 
same time those firms that imported the most actually transformed a great deal of their 
production into distribution, precisely because they were not competitive. Exporting industries, 
instead, were forced to increase their levels of productivity so as to actually export to the region. 
The effect was further reinforced if they were exporting to the rest of the world. Finally, as 
expected, the more concentrated the market in which the establishment operates, the lower the 
rate of growth of productivity, while no significant effect is found on the level of labor 
productivity. 
The final equations describing the determinants of the rate of profits and profit growth 
are econometrically unsatisfactory,
19 and further work needs to be done in this area. Nonetheless, 
two results are worth discussing. Plants in industries with higher union density and a larger 
percentage of workers covered by firm-level agreements have higher rates of profits, holding 
wages constant (direct effect) and also once the indirect effects via wages are considered. 
However, the direct effect of unionization on the rate of growth of profitability is negative, and 
firm level bargaining has no impact on this indicator of firm performance, while the indirect 
effects via wages are negligible (Table 8). This could signal that unions organize in those sectors 
                                                           
19 The set of instruments is not good enough while first order autocorrelation is not present as would be expected 
given the transformation done. 
  35in which there are more rents to be shared while, once there, they prevent further increases in 
profitability.  
The second result worth mentioning is that starting in 1993, the union direct effect on the 
level of profitability increases, while that of firm level bargaining goes down. The explanation 
for the results can again be linked to the changes in the structure of bargaining. Surviving unions 
are still in sectors with the highest level of supernormal rents. However, if workers worry and 
negotiate over employment at the firm level, then job stability might be gained and wage 
inflation and profitability sacrificed in order to face the new economic framework in the 1990s. 
As a consequence, the negative effect of unions on the rate of growth of profitability remains 
negative while firm level bargaining reduces it.  
In Table 8 the direct and indirect effects that unions have on the different dimensions of 
firms performance are summarized. It must be stressed that here analyzed are the effects of 
unionization at the industry level on the performance of the firm. Thus gaps between unionized 
and non-unionized firms are not being calculated, but rather the effects that the extent and 
structure of bargaining have on the indicators of firm performance. The results should then be 
read as: firms in unionized sectors pay relatively higher wages/employ more workers/ invest 
more/are relatively more productive/get higher profits but at a lower rate than those in less 
unionized industries.  
 
Table 8. Estimated Effects of Unions on Firm Performance 
  Wage Employ-
ment 
  Investment 
Level      Rate 
  Productivity 
Level    Growth 
                Profitability 
    Before 1993       After 1992 
  Level  Growth  Level  Growth 
Coefficients (LR)        
Union  variable  0.075  0.292 0.766  0.961  0.058 0.147 0.091  -0.090  0.200  -0.090 
Other  variables                 
Wages    -0.865  0.889  0.666      -0.123 -0.083 -0.123  -0.083 
Employment         -0.907 -0.628       
Effects                  
Direct  0.027  0.107  0.280  0.351   0.021  0.054   0.033  -0.033   0.073  -0.033 
Indirect    -0.024  0.024  0.018  -0.075 -0.052  -0.003 -0.002 -0.003  -0.002 
Total  0.027  0.083  0.304  0.369  -0.054  0.002   0.029  -0.035  0.070  -0.035 
  Note: “LR” means long run. 
 
Given the theoretically feasible, but somewhat surprising, positive direct effects of unions 
on the variables studied, except for profitability growth, and since these results are robust across 
  36different estimation techniques, further explored are possible biases in the estimation procedure. 
These biases could be the result of unobserved variables (such as management quality and 
practices), the result of some exogenous processes taking place that could account for union 
organization, or even sample biases not properly modeled. In order to shed light on the possible 
existence of biases we explored whether unions had organized in sectors with particularly high 
productivity, for example, and studied the rank correlations for 1984, the year when unions re-
organized after the military regime. Unfortunately no data on investments, concentration or 
profits is available for that year. With respect to wages, employment and productivity, no 
significant high rank correlation was found (the highest Spearman was 0.33).
20 Also used were 
the 1988 rankings for investments and concentration as proxies for those in 1984, assuming that 
neither the levels of investment nor of concentration could drastically change between those 
years. Again, no significant rank correlation could be found using the 37 industries under study. 
Cross-tabulations for the levels of unionization were also performed, and some relationship was 
found among concentration, effective rates of protection, and union density in 1985 (based on 
data from Sapelli, 1986). However the relation is not systematic across the different categories 
defined.
21 These results suggest that these sectors could have been more profitable, and that 
unions could have organized better in them, eventually preventing further increases in 
profitability in those industries that, nonetheless, were the most exposed to competition by trade 
liberalization policies.  
An alternative source of biases in the results could be due to the fact that in the 
unbalanced panel under study there are firms that survive, die, and are born and unions could 
have an effect on their survival and mortality odds. That is, if unions actually hindered firm 
performance, they would increase the mortality rate in the industry. In that scenario, those firms 
that would actually survive “despite” high union levels in their industry would be those that 
excelled on some other unobservable dimension (such as high quality management) but not 
precisely due to the effect of union behavior. In order to explore the issue we estimated a 
proportional hazard model was estimated calculated Kaplan-Meier hazard estimates were 
calculated (the results are presented in Annex 3). These models analyze the relative probability 
                                                           
20 Basically, industries are rank-ordered along the different variables, and the cancellation between these variables 
and unionization is calculated. 
21 For example, although the most concentrated industries are also the most unionized, the relationship cannot be 
extended to all the other strata, defined according to the degree of concentration.  
  37of survival for a firm controlling for the relevant variables (the same used in the models 
described earlier in this study). The difference between both techniques refers to the former 
assuming a particular density function for the odds of surviving (Cox) while no distribution is 
assumed in the latter case. The variables used to explain the survival rates included the degree of 
unionization of the industry the firm belonged to and the structure of bargaining in that sector. 
The results indicate that there is no effect of unions on firm mortality while firm-level bargaining 
has a positive significant effect on firm survival, as expected. Therefore, it is concluded that 
there is no significant bias in the sample indirectly related to unionization. 
As to unobservable variables like the quality of management or actual management 
practices, the survival analysis does not make it possible to control for them, as is the case with 
all other models. It is certainly possible that those firms belonging to industries with higher 
levels of unionization could have better quality of management, particularly given the bias 
towards large firms in the panel. Despite this fact, it is clear that given the variables included in 
the models, the results are not biased, except for the apparent capability of unions to organize in 






This paper has analyzed the effects of unions on wages and the performance of firms during the 
period 1988-1995. The main findings suggest that unions increase both wages and employment; 
promote investment due to the firms substituting labor by capital; organize in those plants with 
higher rate of profits, but promote increases in productivity and prevent profitability increases. 
The mechanism at work seems to be that, given that the result of union action is wage inflation 
and labor hoarding, firms have moved to more capital-intensive technologies, hence increasing 
the rate of growth of labor productivity and reducing that of profitability. The hypothesis is 
consistent with unions reducing the share of non-production workers in total employment, as 
found in Cassoni and Labadie (2001). 
Negotiating at the firm level meant different things in different periods. Before 1993, 
given the mandatory extension of collective agreements, it is possible that bargaining at the firm 
level further reinforced the previous effects on wages and hence the indirect effects on the other 
  38variables. However, no statistically significant effects are found. The change in the structure of 
bargaining at the beginning of the 1990s, however, introduced another effect of unions that is 
linked to bargaining at a decentralized level. If unions started caring more about job instability 
than in the past, then they would be willing to negotiate over employment at the cost of lower 
wage inflation. This is in fact what happened in many cases in Uruguay, given this paper’s 
interpretation of collective agreements registered at the Ministry of Labor in the period. 
Although statistically significant coefficients cannot be found with the dataset used, the signs are 
the expected ones and other research points in the same direction (Cassoni and Labadie, 2001).
22 
Nonetheless, it is found that firm-level bargaining reduces levels and rates of investment, 
increases productivity and profitability, and has no effect on the rate of growth of profits. 
Moreover, after 1993, the more workers covered by decentralized bargaining, the lower the 
increase in profitability. The evidence points at negotiations taking into account the interests of 
both parties, so that enhanced productivity and probably survival are achieved together with 
lower rates of substitution of labor by capital and/or lower profits. 
   Union action is associated with increases in the level of investment. The result can be 
linked to the decline in the relative price of capital that unions generate when increasing the 
wages of those workers in unionized firms. It should also be related to firms’ interest in 
overcoming rigidities and transaction costs introduced by union action. As firm-level bargaining 
becomes more frequent, the positive effect is reduced. No doubt it is easier to bargain over the 
introduction of new technology at the establishment level, so that union resistance diminishes 
and at the same time union-management cooperation becomes more feasible. 
Unions increase productivity and productivity growth, while increased coverage of firm-
level agreements further reinforces the effect. This may support arguments derived from the 
industrial relations literature, such as that unions promote cooperation and high morale among 
groups of workers.  However, given the Uruguayan general economic framework, especially at 
the beginning of the 1990s, the fact that unions decrease labor turnover may also have been a 
cause.  
  The above results are consistent with unions generating higher rates of profits. If they 
promoted investment in new technology, they generated increased productivity and productivity 
                                                           
22 This might be the consequence of the scarce number of years included in the analysis, particularly for the second 
period. 
  39growth. So, in spite of rising wage levels, they could consistently allow the firm to obtain higher 
profits. However, given their negative effect on the rate of growth of profitability, the result is 
also reflecting the fact that unions tended to organize and to be stronger in those sectors in which 
extra rents were higher due to monopoly power. 
As a final comment, the results here summarized should be seen in light of the de-
unionization process that has been taking place in the country.  First, there is no doubt that the 
affiliation rate diminished in the 1990s, mostly due to the non-enforceability of collective 
agreements. However, the decline reported in the aggregate statistics overestimates the real 
magnitude, as it refers to the evolution of membership in industry-level unions that, in turn, 
belong to the central union. Hence, workers organized in unions at the firm and establishment 
levels are not included. Second, the results suggest that bargaining at the firm level has promoted 
easier ways of introducing new technology, increases in productivity, higher job stability, more 
moderate wage inflation and lower increases of profitability. Thus, it is sensible to think that 
cooperation between workers and managers acted as a means of facing the new economic 
environment. If this is so, then policymakers should evaluate the benefits of supporting 
bargaining so that the smallest firms can also enjoy the positive effects of unions. The policy, 
however, need to be well balanced, as while setting general rules to protect the parties is 
necessary, special care has to be taken in order not to introduce rigidities that prevent the process 
from incorporating the specific characteristics of each unit. 
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  44Annex 1.   Descriptive Statistics 
Table A1. Mean Value of Selected Variables by Industry, 1985-1999 
(Industry data) 


















Total Mfg.  0.010  0.40  0.28  0.23  0.53  -0.01  1.35  4.28  2.13
Food,beverage 
& tobacco  0.005  0.43 0.28  0.23  0.53  -0.01 1.78  4.69 2.08
Textiles & leather  0.003  0.45  0.28  0.23  0.53  -0.02  1.53  4.63  2.04
Paper 0.027  0.35  0.28  0.23  0.53  -0.05  0.98  3.99  2.18
Oil & chemicals  0.011  0.61  0.28  0.23  0.53  -0.01  1.68  4.24  2.27
Non-metallic 
minerals  0.013 0.18  0.28  0.23  0.53  0.02 0.82  3.84  2.08
Metallic products  0.000  0.38  0.28  0.23  0.53  -0.02  1.31  4.26  2.13
              
              


















Total Manufacturing  0.103  0.25  0.52  0.27  0.79  -0.19 1.34  4.12  2.35
Food,beverage&toba
cco 0.098  0.24  0.52  0.27 
0.79 
-0.11 1.84  4.58  2.26
Textiles & leather  0.083  0.19  0.52  0.27  0.79  -0.24 1.41  4.35  2.24
Paper 0.199  0.29  0.52  0.27  0.79  -0.20 1.03  3.86  2.44
Oil & chemicals  0.045  0.54  0.52  0.27  0.79  -0.22 1.65  4.07  2.57
Non-metallic 
minerals 0.186  0.08  0.52  0.27 
0.79 
-0.15 0.86  3.73  2.27
Metallic products  0.010  0.18  0.52  0.27  0.79  -0.23 1.23  4.10  2.32
  
  
  Source: National Institute of Statistics.
  45Table A2. Mean Value of Selected Variables by Surviving Status, 1988 - 1995 











Alive during the whole period  0.06 0.14  0.09  0.73  183.59  0.37 
Born in the period and surviving  0.05 0.14  0.10  0.73  1,300.43  0.05 
Born in the period and dead  0.06 0.00  0.09  0.67  87.24  0.34 
Dead in the period  0.03 0.16  0.09  0.70  152.12  0.29 
Alive, dead, rebirth and surviving  0.03 0.15  0.09  0.73  140.62  0.27 
Alive, dead, rebirth and dead  0.01 0.06  0.02  0.69  145.41  0.34 
            
Total 0.05  0.14  0.09  0.72  213.32  0.33 
            
            















Alive during the whole period  0.37 0.02  42.41  123.22  7,2359.79  1,718.45 
Born in the period and surviving  0.26 0.03  46.80  74.34  3,4605.31  516.41 
Born in the period and dead  0.40 0.02  41.56  33.73  2,2700.67  56.21 
Dead in the period  0.38 0.01  35.09  90.01  2,0948.56  2,961.59 
Alive, dead, rebirth and surviving  0.35 0.02  34.85  70.49  2,4635.29  755.96 
Alive, dead, rebirth and dead  0.36 0.02  29.19  33.07  3,969.44  797.32 
            
Total 0.36  0.01  40.23  108.11  55,302.62  1,769.43 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on micro data from the Industrial Survey, National  
Institute of Statistics, Uruguay. 
 
 
Table 3. Distribution of the Sample According to Different Variables, 1988-1995 
    (percentages) 
Establishment Variables  0% - 25%  25% - 50%  50% -75%  75% - 100%
%Blues 3.4 10.6 32.2  53.8
Exports/Sales 81.5 5.3 4.4  8.8
Size 95.7 2.9 0.6  0.8
Industry Variables   
Union density  29.3 49.3 12.5  8.9
%Regional Exports  29.4 10.6 12.8  47.2
%Regional Imports  12.6 52.7 23.9  10.8
Exports/Sales 60.6 23.4 14.4  1.6
Imports/Consumption 44.8 26.4 14.4  14.4
C4 3.8 40.7 31.4  24.2
       Source: Authors’ calculations based on micro data from the Industrial Survey, National  
             Institute of Statistics, Uruguay 
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Economy variables          
































Sargan test   0.994 0.842     0.000 0.010 0.000 0.006 
1st order 
autocorrelation 
0.644 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2nd order 
autocorrelation 
0.753 0.125 0.298 0.375 0.000 0.728 0.000 0.421 




  48Establishment 
Variables 
  Productivity level 
Levels   Deviations 
 Productivity growth 
Levels        Deviations 
 Profitability  level 
 Levels        Deviations 
Profitability  growth 
 Levels        Deviations 




      








    
Capital / employment 
 rate of growth 




    
Raw materials / 
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(0.034)       -----       -----       -----       ----- 
Industry variables           
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Economy variables           
























    
Sargan test        0.319  0.741  0.406  0.791 
1st order 
autocorrelation 
0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.581 0.178 0.174 0.192 
2nd order 
autocorrelation 
0.000 0.814  0.047 0.066 0.056 0.687 0.681 0.2633 
Nº of observations  4849 4849  3073 3073 4849 4849 3073 3073 
Instruments used for the wage are its own first lag; the income of the informal sector; the income of the informal    
sector times the unemployment rate; and the income of the informal sector times the average duration of the 
unemployment spell.   
 
  49Annex 3.  Mortality Proportional Hazards Model 
 
Variables 
Hazard      
Ratio  Std. Error         z          P>|z|     
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Establishment level            
Exports/Sales      0.89415    0.173049      -0.578    0.563  .6118932   1.306619
Capital/Employment   0.99570   0.002010      -2.719   0.007   .9926091   .9987978
Size    0.00191   0.002799      -4.267   0.000   .0001074   .0338591
Industry level   
%Regional Imports     0.49103   0.252471      -1.383   0.167   .1792484   1.345141
%Regional Exports    1.10452   0.475619      0.231   0.817   .4749409   2.568689
Exports/Sales   2.17809   1.726752      0.982   0.326   .4605328   10.30133
Imports/Consumption     0.86491    0.126502      -0.992   0.321    .6493408   1.15204
C4    0.05141   0.062026      -2.460   0.014   .0048325   .5469857
Union Density      0.82736     0.413290     -0.379   0.704   .3108086   2.202389
Union 
Density*dummy1993    1.63094    1.042497       0.765   0.444     .4659636   5.708551
%workers covered by 
firm level agreements   0.00519   0.016848     -1.622   0.105    9.00e-06   2.997378
%workers covered by 
firm level agreements 
*dummy93 
 
21.15768    69.370140      0.931   0.352   .0342464   13071.36
Economy level   
Equivalent Tariff      0.000014   0.000043   -3.564  0.000    2.95e-08   .0064996
          Note: The specification includes industry dummies that are not reported. Robust standard errors are 
          reported. 
 
The results indicate that the capital/labor ratio is neutral with respect to the mortality of 
firms (significant but not different than 1); the size of the firm has a positive effect (lower than 1 
and significant), market concentration (C4) increases the probability of survival (lower than 1 
and significant), and tariff protection also has a positive effect in the odds of surviving (that is, 
higher implicit tariff—lower degree of openness—increases the probability of survival for the 
establishment).  
Among the union variables, union density at the industry level has a positive effect, but it 
is not statistically significant, so that there are no union effects on survival odds. The change that 
took place in 1993—here modeled including a dummy variable multiplying union density—has 
no significant effect using this dataset covering just up to 1995. If it were to be considered, 
however, it would lower the probability of survival relative to the previous period but the overall 
effect (adding the coefficients of union density and union density times dummy1993) would still 
be lower than 1, the result thus being that unionization increases the probability of survival. The 
only significant result is that of firm-level bargaining, which increases the probability of survival 
even more than does size, for example. 
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